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Undue Burdens and Potential Opportunities in Voting
Rights and Abortion Law
PAMELA S. KARLAN*
Reaching for the world, as our lives do,
As all lives do, reaching that we may give
The best of what we are and hold as true:
Always it is by bridges that we live.1
One of the problems with the way we have tried to build a more just constitutional
law is our failure to see, and then to make the most of, doctrinal connections across
constitutional subfields—that is, to build constitutional bridges. This Essay seeks to
build one such bridge between two areas of legal doctrine that might seem relatively
disconnected from one another: voting rights and reproductive justice.2
Many years ago, I joked about one aspect of that connection: “Redistricting, like
reproduction, combines lofty goals, deep passions about identity and instincts for
self-preservation, increasing reliance on technology, and often a need to ‘pull [and]
haul’ rather indelicately at the very end. And of course, it often involves somebody
getting screwed.”3 But the connection between them is actually more profound—and

* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School, and Co-Director, Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic. I thank Viola
Canales and Kate Fetrow for many helpful conversations along the way and the participants
at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law and American Constitution Society symposium on the Future of the U.S. Constitution. At the time the symposium was conceived and I
started work on this Essay, the future looked rather different than it did after the election of
2016. I take my inspiration from the directive in the Pirkei Avot that “[y]ou are not required
to complete the work, but neither are you at liberty to abstain from it.” CENTRAL CONFERENCE
OF AM. RABBIS, GATES OF PRAYER: THE NEW UNION PRAYERBOOK 20 (1975). It may take
longer than I initially thought, or hoped, for constitutional law to revisit questions of economic
equality more broadly, but this Essay seeks at least to begin that process. In the interest of full
disclosure, I note that I participated directly in several cases discussed in this Essay: Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (as counsel for the petitioners); Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (as counsel for amicus curiae California Medical Association);
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (as
counsel for the United States during my time at the Department of Justice), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 1399 (2017); and Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (same), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).
1. PHILIP LARKIN, Bridge for the Living, in COLLECTED POEMS 189 (Anthony Thwaite
ed., 2003).
2. In an earlier contribution to the Indiana Law Journal, I tried to build another such
bridge. I used themes developed in the religion clause cases—that “[f]ree people are entitled
to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain nor to direct”; that
the Constitution should combat the creation of an outsider class; and that judicial review
should prevent capture and exploitation of the machinery of government—to suggest how we
ought to think about regulating political parties, redistricting, and campaign finance. Pamela
S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases
Illuminate the Law of Democracy?, 83 IND. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2008).
3. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
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potentially more promising. First, a citizen’s right to vote and a woman’s right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy share a distinctive structure: they are rightscreating rights that lie at the intersection of the liberty and equality values expressed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, these two rights have been subject to a similar doctrinal evolution over the last half century, as the Supreme Court first ratcheted
up and then relaxed the level of judicial scrutiny; both are now subject to an undue
burden standard. That doctrinal retrenchment has, rightly, been subject to withering
criticism. Finally, in several recent cases, courts have begun to analyze burdens on
voting rights and access to abortion in ways that take account of how people actually
live and that account for the interaction between the challenged restrictions and socioeconomic disadvantage. This emerging, more muscular understanding of undue
burden allows us an opportunity, within the confines of current constitutional doctrine, to talk about how economic inequality and poverty undermine constitutional
values of self-determination, liberty, and equality. Perhaps these undue burden cases
can become an opening wedge in litigation over the Constitution and what equal
opportunity should mean more generally.
I. FOUNDATIONAL AND STEREOSCOPIC RIGHTS
To call the entitlement to do (or to resist doing) something a “right” is to give that
entitlement special force.4 All constitutional rights, almost by definition, thus express
important commitments. That being said, voting rights and abortion rights have a
form of what Kenneth Karst has called “analytical primacy.”5
The Supreme Court long ago declared the right to vote “fundamental” because it
is “preservative of all rights.”6 The ordinary way in which individuals acquire most
rights or protect the rights they already have is through the political processes of selfgovernment. Particularly given the fact that the U.S. Constitution confers few affirmative rights directly, virtually all of the important social and economic rights that
Americans enjoy today are the product of legislation passed by elected officials.
Rights to health care are provided through Medicare and Medicaid and the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act; workers’ rights are protected through
the National Labor Relations Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and Title
VII; the right to a clean environment is protected by the Clean Water Act and the
Clean Air Act.7 Under existing doctrine, none of these rights are protected fully and

STAN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1998) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)).
4. LEIF WENAR, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5.1 (Edward N. Zalta
ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights [https://perma.cc/M28XMHP2].
5. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1977) (applying this concept to
the right to vote) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship]. Karst later offered a parallel assessment of reproductive autonomy. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624, 659–64 (1980).
6. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
7. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (upholding a federal statute that enabled Puerto Rican voters to cast ballots without having to be literate in English “as
a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory
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directly by the Constitution, and none of these statutes were constitutionally compelled.8 These rights are protected because citizens elected public officials who voted
to enact laws conferring particular entitlements.
Even rights that lie at the core of our constitutional culture are often given real
force only once elected officials intervene. Brown v. Board of Education9 is surely
the most celebrated case in modern constitutional law. And yet, the Supreme Court’s
decision achieved virtually no desegregation on its own.10 Only after Congress enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare threatened to cut off federal funds to recalcitrant districts did
school systems begin to comply with the constitutional command.11
Ironically, the same is true of the right to vote itself. The most robust protections
of that right have come from legislation and not from courts acting on their own to
enforce constitutional commands. For example, although the Fifteenth Amendment
forbids denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,12 virtually all black
citizens in the South were disenfranchised for decades. Litigation was slow and only
minimally successful until Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.13 Federal
examiners authorized by a provision in that Act added more black citizens in the
South to the voting rolls in two years than had been registered in the entire preceding
century.14 Litigation under sections 2 and 5 of the Act transformed the composition
of school boards, city councils, and legislatures throughout the nation, ultimately
transforming policies as well.15
And even rights that courts do locate expressly in the Constitution are, in reality,
shaped by elections at one or two steps’ remove. The judges themselves, after all, are

treatment by government—both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or
administration of governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement”).
8. As opposed to, for example, the constitutional command that Congress provide for a
census every ten years, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, or that each house keep, and publish, a
“Journal of its Proceedings,” id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Roughly a decade after Brown, only 2.3% of black children in the South attended a
school with any white students. Case Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School
Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 322 (1967).
11. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2012).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”). Section 2 of the amendment gives Congress “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Id. amend XV, § 2. As the text indicates, effective
enfranchisement of African Americans has depended on congressional enforcement of section
1’s prohibition.
13. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
14. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 21 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
15. For two wide-ranging discussions, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 379–382 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman
eds., 1994); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING
RIGHTS 30–33 (2010).
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either elected (in the overwhelming majority of states) or (at the federal level) nominated and appointed by people who are. As recent work by Reva Siegel and David
Cole has shown, judicial constitutional interpretations are the products of complex
political and social forces that often originate in popular movements and political
activity.16 For anyone who was under the illusion that constitutional interpretation is
sealed off from voting, the election of 2016, which placed Neil Gorsuch on the
Supreme Court rather than Merrick Garland, offers a sobering lesson. The kind of
constitutional doctrine we will have in the future will be shaped by the kinds of
Presidents who nominate judges, and the kinds of Senators who confirm them. Who
votes, and how, will determine who interprets the Constitution.17
The ability to control one’s reproductive capacity is also a rights-protecting right.
“The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart” of a “cluster
of constitutionally protected choices” that are themselves treated as fundamental.18
A person who lacks the right to make that decision will be circumscribed in how she
exercises all the other rights tied to reproduction and family formation. And even
beyond the way in which reproductive autonomy is preservative of that constellation
of fundamental constitutional rights, it is preservative of a “basic control over [one’s]
life.”19 Modern America offers its residents a panoply of choices, but “a woman must
have control over her own maternity in order to control her future: education, work,
marriage, the support of other children, or any life plan she might have.”20
Voting rights and abortion rights share another distinctive characteristic: they are
“stereoscopic,” lying at the intersection of the liberty and equality interests protected
by adjacent clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment.21

16. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (explaining how recent marriage equality and gun rights decisions are the product of social movements and political activism influencing how courts interpret the Equal Protection Clause and the Second Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism As Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 201 (2008) (exploring the role of popular constitutionalism in the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment decision). See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (exploring how ultimate control over constitutional interpretation in the long run is a product of politics).
17. Cf. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901), http://tinyurl.com
/FPDunne-MrDooley [https://perma.cc/TM9C-DMMR] (providing the original source for the
statement that the Supreme Court follows the election returns). Given its various interventions,
“[t]oday, the Court produces the election system almost as much as the election system produces the Court.” Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 521, 522 (1996).
18. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (pointing to the right to
marry, the right to procreate, rights involving family relationships, and the right to control over
child rearing).
19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
20. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 125 (2007).
21. I first developed the concept of “stereoscopic” rights in Pamela S. Karlan, Equal
Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV.
473 (2002). The Supreme Court invoked a similar idea in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
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Rights are conventionally framed as a species of individual liberty to be protected
by the Due Process Clause.22 Voting rights and access to abortion, however, are not
simply about individual autonomy untethered from social realities. These liberty interests are bound up in considerations of equality as well.
Voting has both individual and aggregative dimensions. With respect to the former, the right to vote is a fundamental public expression of equal citizenship and
dignity.23 That dignitary interest matters without regard to the outcome of any particular election.24 But the right to vote also gains much of its importance from the
way in which it determines winners and losers, and ultimately public policy, by
adding votes together. This aspect of voting is necessarily about groups of citizens
who share common political preferences, which may themselves be the product of
other characteristics the citizens share.25 And when some groups have more opportunity than other groups to affect election outcomes, this becomes a question of
equality, not just liberty. Cases involving claims of racial vote dilution, unconstitutional political gerrymandering, malapportionment, or excessive reliance on race in
the redistricting process are cases about voting rights that inherently sound in one
form of equality or another.26 The upshot, as put succinctly by Dean Chemerinsky,
is that “the Supreme Court repeatedly has declared that the right to vote is a

(1954), to explain why the federal government could not segregate schools in the District of
Columbia. That day, the Court had held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
that racial segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That amendment binds only the states. The Fifth Amendment, by contrast, binds the federal
government but does not contain an equal protection clause. The Court explained that because
the concepts of equal protection and due process “both stem[] from our American ideal of
fairness,” the Fifth Amendment prohibits “discrimination” that is “unjustifiable.” Bolling, 347
U.S. at 499.
22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (further explaining that the
Due Process Clause “also provides heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests”).
23. For discussions of this point, see Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual
Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1334–36 (2011); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–11 (1993); Karst, Equal
Citizenship, supra note 5, at 28–30.
24. See, e.g., Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering a new election
because voting booths had been racially segregated, even though the segregation did not necessarily affect the outcome of the election, because “gross, unsophisticated, significant, and
obvious racial discriminations” tainted the election).
25. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that “groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do
not”). I develop a tripartite taxonomy of the interests involved in voting—participation, aggregation, and governance—in Karlan, supra note 23, at 1709–20.
26. That doctrinal categorization was in part strategic. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty,
The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1508–09 (2002) (suggesting that in Harper v.
State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)—the case in which the Supreme Court began
to ratchet up the level of scrutiny—the Court “self-consciously aligned itself on the opposite
side of [the] now-reviled [Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which had relied on
substantive due process and] squarely on the more righteous [Equal Protection Clause-based]
trajectory” that had led to “Brown v. Board of Education and beyond”).
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fundamental right protected under equal protection.”27
But as the list of potential equality claims shows, voting rights doctrine has been
driven by more than the notion of abstract equality that lies at the heart of one person,
one vote. It is impossible to understand virtually any aspect of constitutional voting
rights doctrine without taking account of the struggle for racial equality. Much of the
law has focused directly on questions of racial justice, precisely because racial minorities have so often borne the brunt of restrictions on the right to vote or of electoral
arrangements that operate “designedly or otherwise” to “cancel out the voting
strength” of particular “elements of the voting population.”28 And even doctrines that
are not on their face directed at racial equality often originated in concerns about it.29
It is impossible to explain the trajectory of U.S. voting rights law without taking race
into account.30
The entwinement of liberty and group equality is equally at the core of abortion
rights. Here, too, in its foundational decision in Roe v. Wade,31 the Supreme Court
invoked the liberty of each individual protected by the Due Process Clause as the
source of constitutional protection for a woman’s right to make the decision whether
to terminate a pregnancy. But from the very outset, supporters of abortion rights also
pressed the claim that abortion was critical to women’s equality as well.32 Women
can attain full equality in the public sphere only if they can control their fertility, and
access to abortion remains a critical element of that control. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,33 the joint opinion of Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter pointed to the fact that “[t]he ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated

27. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 893–94 (4th
ed. 2011).
28. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
29. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy, 67 ALA.
L. REV. 415, 416–21 (2015) (discussing this connection between racial equality and the
Supreme Court’s imposition of one person, one vote). That connection may actually be quite
a bit deeper. The first federal requirement for equipopulous districting appeared in the first
apportionment bill after the Civil War. See An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives
to Congress Among the Several States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28
(1872). A central focus of that Act, and the debate leading up to it, was how to ensure political
equality for newly freed slaves in the South. See George David Zuckerman, A Consideration
of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L.
REV. 93, 107–116 (1961) (discussing the legislative history of the Act).
30. For a striking recent example, consider Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017),
which involved a challenge to North Carolina’s congressional district map. Every member of
the Court agreed that racial and political considerations were closely tied to one another; they
disagreed only over whether racial concerns predominated over political ones, or vice versa.
Compare id. at 1473–74 (opinion of the Court), with id. at 1503–04 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. For three celebrated examples, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 659–64 (1980); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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by their ability to control their reproductive lives”34 and that “[a]n entire generation
has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of
women to act in society” as a reason to reaffirm Roe’s central holding.35 Justice
Ginsburg has even more directly linked abortion rights to a “woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”36
The fundamental role of both voting and control over one’s fertility in enabling
full and equal participation in civic life led the Supreme Court, during the early
1970s, to demand heightened scrutiny of laws that restricted these two rights. With
respect to voting, the Court declared that “if a challenged statute grants the right to
vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, ‘the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.’”37 That
is the language of strict scrutiny. With respect to abortion, the Court actually quoted
its earlier voting rights decision that laws limiting “fundamental rights” could “be
justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’”38 and required that restrictions on access to abortion “must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”39 In both areas, then, the normal presumption of constitutionality was
abandoned in favor of deep judicial skepticism.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts retreated dramatically from the strict scrutiny
regimes in both voting rights and abortion rights cases. In their place, the Court announced standards that asked whether the challenged law imposes an undue burden
on the underlying right. Those tests abandoned the presumption that restrictions on
the right to vote, or on a woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy, deserved
searching judicial review. They replaced them with a fluid inquiry in which the
Justices often substituted intuition for rigorous analysis of the purpose and effect of
the challenged regulations.40
The retreat in voting rights began in Burdick v. Takushi,41 where the Supreme
Court upheld Hawaii’s refusal to permit write-in voting—an unusual provision, and
far removed from the sort of restriction on the franchise that had prompted the
Court’s adoption of heightened scrutiny. The Court rejected the idea that “a law that
imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.”42 That
requirement, the Court declared, would too stringently “tie the hands” of the states,
because every election law “will invariably impose some burden upon individual

34. Id. at 856 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
35. Id. at 860.
36. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627).
39. Id.
40. For a general discussion of undue burden standards across a wide array of constitutional issues, see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1994).
41. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
42. Id. at 432.
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voters.”43 So the Court borrowed the more “flexible” standard it had earlier applied
to laws restricting candidates’ access to the ballot.44 Under that standard, a reviewing
court
must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff's rights.”45
Only if the burdens are “severe” must the restriction be “narrowly drawn to advance
a state interest of compelling importance.”46 Otherwise, a state’s “‘important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”47
Burdick was announced during what was, in retrospect, one of the high-water
marks of voting rights in the United States.48 Many of the traditional restrictions on
the right to vote—poll taxes, literacy tests, various restrictive registration practices—
had either been struck down by the Supreme Court or abolished by federal law.49
And the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act kept many
jurisdictions that had had a history of restrictions on the right to vote from enacting
new ones. Moreover, the restriction in Burdick did not bar individuals from voting
altogether; nor, as an empirical matter, did it seem to systematically prevent identifiable groups of voters from electing candidates of their choice.
Shortly after the turn of the century, however, the United States began to experience a wave of voting restrictions that did pose those threats of disenfranchisement
and group disempowerment: the “new vote denial.”50 In the first of these cases to
reach the Supreme Court, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,51 the Court
applied the Burdick framework, rather than strict scrutiny. The case concerned
Indiana’s voter ID law, which required voters to present currently valid, governmentissued photo identification in order to cast a ballot that would be counted. Justice
Stevens’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court insisted that “‘evenhanded

43. Id. at 433.
44. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983)).
45. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
46. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
47. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
48. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 295–98 (rev. ed. 2009) (showing that the right to vote
has expanded and contracted across American history).
49. For example, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolished poll taxes for federal elections, and the Supreme Court then struck them down for all other elections. See Harper v. Va.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). Congress permanently prohibited all literacy tests
nationwide in 1970. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10501 (2015). For examples of cases striking down restrictive residency requirements, see, for example, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
50. The phrase was introduced by Professor Dan Tokaji. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote
Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 692 (2006).
51. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself’ are
not invidious.”52 For most voters, even most voters currently lacking acceptable
forms of ID, he thought the burdens imposed by the statute were relatively minor.
And because the case was before the Court on a facial, pre-enforcement challenge,
there was nothing in the record “to quantify . . . the magnitude of the burden” on the
“narrow class of voters” who might experience a “special burden” under the statute
due to “economic or other personal limitations.”53
On the other side of the ledger, Justice Stevens credited several interests the State
had advanced. For present purposes, the two most salient were preventing voter fraud
and promoting voter confidence. The Justice’s discussion of fraud prevention veered
perilously close to the most toothless form of rationality review. He acknowledged
that the “only kind of voter fraud” that a photo ID requirement could prevent is inperson voter impersonation at the polls.54 And he conceded that there was “no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”55
But he pointed to “infamous examples” of such fraud in nineteenth-century New
York,56 some “scattered instances of in-person voter fraud” in other states more recently,57 and one example of absentee-ballot fraud in an Indiana municipal election
to conclude that “not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the
outcome of a close election.”58 Given these anecdotes, he implied that a state might
somehow rationally adopt voter identification requirements to protect the integrity
of its elections against the possibility that some form of in-person impersonation
fraud might emerge in the future.
One step further removed was the State’s interest in “protecting public confidence” in that integrity.59 Justice Stevens saw “independent significance” in this interest “because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.”60 A
few Terms later, the Court went even further, in vacating preliminary relief against
an Arizona voter ID law:
Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and
breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes
will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. “[T]he
right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight

52. Id. at 189–90 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9). Justice Stevens wrote for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy. Since Justice Scalia’s opinion for himself, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Alito would have upheld the challenged statute after looking at the impact
of the law on “voters generally,” id. at 206 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
in original), rather than by considering its impact on the voters most affected, it is fair to treat
Justice Stevens’s opinion, to the extent it upheld the law, as controlling.
53. Id. at 199–200 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
54. Id. at 194.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 195 n.11.
57. Id. at 195 n.12.
58. Id. at 196.
59. Id. at 197.
60. Id.
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of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.”61
In other words, states are entitled to protect the rights of voters who would otherwise
“feel” disenfranchised by actually disenfranchising some number of their citizens.
There is simply no way to reconcile the Court’s extraordinary deference in
Crawford and Purcell with its earlier skepticism about voting restrictions, particularly in light of Justice Stevens’s recognition that “partisan considerations may have
played a significant role” in the Republican-dominated legislature’s decision to impose the new ID requirement.62 Even after acknowledging that such motivations
standing alone would be as “invidious” as the inadequate justifications for “the poll
tax at issue in Harper [v. State Board of Elections],”63 the Justice did not ask the
normal next question in constitutional law: would the challenged ID requirement
have been adopted in the absence of that impermissible motive? Both in its approach
to what counts as a burden that should prompt judicial skepticism and in its explanation of how to determine whether that burden is “undue”—that is, cannot be justified
by the State’s asserted interests—Crawford threatened abandonment of meaningful
judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court’s retreat on abortion rights followed a similar trajectory. Even
before the Court formally changed the standard in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,64 the Court had stopped “rigidly insisting upon
‘compelling interests’ and ‘narrow tailoring,’” instead “essentially pass[ing] upon
the ‘reasonableness’ of individual regulations from case to case.”65 In Casey, expressly drawing on the same election-law decisions that were that Term beginning to
reshape its voting rights jurisprudence, the controlling joint opinion of Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter emphasized that “not every law which makes a right
more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right” because states
are entitled to “substantial flexibility.”66 Accordingly, the Justices abandoned conventional strict scrutiny for a different test:

61. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)) (alteration in original).
62. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203.
63. Id. at 203. See also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (holding that
“‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may
vote is constitutionally impermissible”). For a discussion of the partisan motivations behind
many contemporary voting restrictions, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM
FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012) (discussing the increased partisanship in election administration); Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370
(2015) (“[T]he single predictor necessary to determine whether a state will impose voter-access restrictions is whether Republicans control the ballot-access process.”); Pamela S. Karlan,
Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
763, 786–89 (2016).
64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
65. David D. Meyer, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J.L.
& POL’Y 57, 62 (2008).
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach
into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.67
The new undue burden test depended on a form of balancing. A state was entitled
to regulate abortions up to the point at which its regulation “has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.”68 As with the Anderson-Burdick standard for restrictions on voting,
the real action would come in deciding what counted as a “substantial obstacle” (in
the voting cases, a “severe” burden).
In some ways, the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart69 upholding a federal
statute outlawing the use of certain abortion procedures is disturbingly similar to its
decision in Crawford.
First, in rejecting the idea of a facial, pre-enforcement challenge, the Court failed
to focus on the group of people actually burdened by the statute. One of the bases for
the challenge to the federal abortion statute was that it contained no exception for
cases in which the forbidden procedure was necessary to preserve the health of the
woman. Prior Supreme Court decisions had required such exceptions.70 (Another
way of expressing this point is to say that a statute without a health exception placed
an undue burden on a woman whose health was at stake.) But the Carhart Court held
that the plaintiffs had not “demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a
large fraction of relevant cases.”71 The Court seemed to be saying that in cases where
the prohibited procedure was not necessary to preserve the health of the woman, the
absence of a health exception would place no health-related burden on the woman.
But even talking about a “fraction of relevant cases” misses the point: the need for a
health exception is relevant only when a woman’s health is at risk. The fact that most
women needing abortions would not be affected by the lack of a health exception
was true but irrelevant,72 in the same way that the fact that most voters will not be
affected by an ID requirement says nothing about whether the voters who lack ID are
severely burdened. And stating that “[t]he Act is open to a proper as-applied challenge in a discrete case”73 was cold comfort. As with the similar proviso in Crawford,

67. Id. at 874.
68. Id. at 877. The joint opinion’s explanation that a law that, “while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving
its legitimate ends,” id., uses terms like “valid state interest” and “legitimate ends” that seem
far closer to rationality review than to strict scrutiny—which would demand the existence of
a compelling interest as the prerequisite for upholding a challenged statute. See Emma
Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 292 (2013).
69. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
70. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006).
71. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–68.
72. See id. at 188–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (making this point).
73. Id. at 168 (Thomas, J., concurring) (making this point).
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this suggestion left open the question whether each individual burdened would have
to litigate the question in light of the individual’s particular circumstances—itself a
significant burden.74
Second, as it had done in Crawford and Purcell, the Court moved far away from
heightened scrutiny and into the most deferential form of rationality review.
Acknowledging that it had “no reliable data,” the Court offered up its conclusion that
“some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained.”75 There was in fact no more empirical support for that conclusion
than there had been for the proposition that in-person voter impersonation is an actual
problem or that any voter decided not to vote because a jurisdiction lacked a voter
ID law. It was adjudication by anecdote.76
And as with its assertion that imposing restrictions on the right to vote was actually vote protective (because it increased public confidence and thus voter turnout),77
the Carhart Court then sought to couch its approval of restrictions on women’s access to abortion as a woman-protective decision: “The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”78 Left unexplained is how an outright prohibition on the procedure—rather than, say, truthful information about what the
procedure entails—can “inform” a choice that the statute forbids the woman and her
physician from making.79

74. Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right To Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 661–62 (2008)
(discussing what it would mean to have as-applied undue burden challenges to restrictions on
the right to vote).
75. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. Note that the Court never explains whether there is a necessary “connection between regret and a wish to have been precluded from making a choice
in the first place.” Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents
Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts
Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1395 (2008).
76. The sole source cited by the Court was a brief filed on behalf of 180 women. See id.
at 159 (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 05-380, pp. 22–24). There
had been roughly forty-five million legal abortions during the time period covered by the brief.
See Karlan, , supra note 75, at 1394. To the extent there is evidence of regret levels, “[a]bortion
has a comparable or lower rate of decisional regret than do many other procedures: the regret
rate for abortions hovers around 5%, whereas, for instance, 20% of people regret their tattoos,
6% regret sterilizations, 20% regret prostate surgery, and a whopping 42.5% regret some aspect of their treatment for breast cancer.” Kate L. Fetrow, Taking Abortion Rights Seriously:
Towards a Holistic Undue Burden Jurisprudence, 70 STAN. L. REV. 319, 340-41 (2018).
77. An empirically unsupportable proposition itself. See Stephen Ansolabehere &
Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1754–60 (2008).
78. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
79. For persuasive analysis and criticism of the woman-protective rationales for restrictions on access to abortions, see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality
Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007); Reva
Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional
Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007).
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In announcing the undue burden standards, the Justices continued to give lip
service to the importance of the rights at stake. But as they applied those standards
in cases like Crawford, Purcell, Casey, and Carhart, they often seemed to be using
an approach conventionally applied to restrictions on nonfundamental liberty
interests. Intermediate forms of scrutiny generally look at whether the
government’s actual purpose is in fact both “important” and “substantially” served
by the challenged restriction. 80 By contrast, the Justices’ reliance on intuition and
anecdote resembled far more closely standard rationality review in which “[a]
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it;”81 it is “entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature.”82 Faced with a conservative political movement bent on rolling back
protections for both voting rights and abortion rights, this form of undue burden
review provides little protection. It ignores completely the way in which
restrictions on voting and on access to abortion actually operate in the lives of real
people in favor of a stylized vision of the world.
III. REFRAMING UNDUE BURDENS
Blindness to the actual burdens a challenged law imposes on voters or women
who have decided to terminate a pregnancy is not a necessary consequence of adopting an undue burden standard. Several recent decisions show how courts that are
sensitive to the realities of the world “out there”83 determine whether a particular law
imposes a significant burden of the kind that demands judicial skepticism. And those
courts’ descriptions of how socioeconomic disadvantage transforms what might be
only minor impediments for more affluent individuals into constitutionally suspect
burdens offers a vantage point from which to work on the longer-term project of
persuading the people and the courts that our constitutional values are threatened by
economic inequality.84
The two leading judicial discussions of the burdens imposed by the new vote denial appear in cases ultimately resolved under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
which forbids the use of any voting practice or procedure that “results in a denial or

80. This is how the standard for intermediate scrutiny is articulated in cases involving sex
discrimination. See United States v. Virginia, 581 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996) (holding that in
such cases “a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for
actions in fact differently grounded”); id. at 533 (explaining that the government “must show
at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original)).
81. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
82. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (citing U.S. R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
83. I borrow the phrase from Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Beal v. Doe, in which he criticized the majority for upholding Pennsylvania’s refusal to fund abortions for poor women as
part of its Medicaid program. 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 18 (2017).
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abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color” or membership in a language-minority group.85
In North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,86 the Fourth
Circuit struck down provisions in a North Carolina omnibus statute that imposed a
photo ID requirement, cut back on early voting, and eliminated same-day registration
during the early voting period, out-of-precinct voting on Election Day, and
preregistration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.87 In describing the burdens the
omnibus act imposed on African American voters, the Fourth Circuit identified ways
in which the new regime interacted with socioeconomic disadvantage to restrict the
right to vote. For example, the elimination of same-day registration undermined the
ability of citizens with “low literacy skills or other difficulty completing a registration form to receive personal assistance from poll workers.”88 Pointing to the district
court’s findings that African Americans in North Carolina were “disproportionately
likely to move, be poor, less educated, have less access to transportation, and experience poor health,”89 the Fourth Circuit declared that “[t]hese socioeconomic disparities establish that no mere ‘preference’ led African Americans to
disproportionately use early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting,
and preregistration. Nor does preference lead African Americans to
disproportionately lack acceptable photo ID.” Instead, “for many African Americans,
[the provisions that had been eliminated] are a necessity.”90

85. 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10301(a), 10303(f)(2) (2015). For more general discussions of section
2 and the new vote denial, see Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County:
Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
675 (2014); Karlan, , supra note 63; Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote
Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579 (2013); Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote
Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 439 (2015). Because courts generally “will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case,” once
the courts concluded that the challenged provisions violated section 2, they did not fully address the constitutional claim. See Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per
curiam) (applying this principle, often referred to as the Ashwander rule, see Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), to a voting rights
case involving both Voting Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment claims). In both of the
cases discussed in the text, some plaintiffs also alleged that the challenged statutes
impermissibly infringed the fundamental right to vote protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
86. 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
87. See id. at 242.
88. Id. at 217.
89. Id. at 233 (quoting N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp.
3d 320, 432 (M.D.N.C 2016)).
90. Id. The court of appeals also emphasized the interactive nature of the various challenged provisions. Quoting Justice O’Connor’s observation in Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S.
581 (2005), that a “panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered alone,
may nevertheless have the combined effect of severely restricting participation and competition,” id. at 607–08 (O’Connor, J., concurring), the court explained that “the photo ID requirement inevitably increases the steps required to vote, and so slows the process.” McCrory, 831
F.3d at 231. Because there were fewer days of early voting, more voters would find it necessary to vote on Election Day. “Together, these produce longer lines at the polls on Election
Day, and absent out-of-precinct voting, prospective Election Day voters may wait in these
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Similarly, in striking down Texas’s draconian voter ID law as violative of section
2, the Fifth Circuit explained why the law’s “burdens” on minority voters were “excessive”91 by pointing to how the law interacted with socioeconomic conditions. The
ID requirement fell more heavily on poor citizens, with more than one in five voters
earning less than $20,000 per year lacking such documentation, nearly ten times the
rate at which voters earning between $100,000 and $150,000 lacked it. The court of
appeals pointed to testimony about how the “[u]nreliable and irregular wage work
and other income” of poor citizens burdened their ability to “locate and bring the
requisite papers and identity cards, travel to a processing site, wait through the assessment, and get photo identifications.”92 And it explained that “most job opportunities do not include paid sick or other paid leave; taking off from work means lost
income. Employed low-income Texans not already in possession of such documents
will struggle to afford income loss from the unpaid time needed to get photo identification.”93
Moreover, precisely because poor Texans were less likely to own cars, they had
less need for driver’s licenses (the primary form of government-issued photo ID).
For them to travel to a DMV office to get even the formally no-cost election identification certificate Texas purportedly made available imposed a significant burden:
“Of eligible voters without access to a vehicle, a large percentage faced trips of three
hours or more to obtain an [election identification certificate].”94
Moreover, the court of appeals praised the district judge, Nelva Gonzales Ramos,
for going beyond just “statistical disparity” to rest its findings on “concrete evidence”
from individual citizens “regarding the excessive burdens” they faced.95 Those
stories make for powerful, and powerfully disturbing, reading about the obstacles
faced by indigent citizens in negotiating everyday life and exercising the rights they

longer lines only to discover that they have gone to the wrong precinct and are unable to travel
to their correct precincts. Thus, cumulatively, the panoply of restrictions results in greater disenfranchisement than any of the law’s provisions individually.” Id.; see also NAACP State
Conference of Pa. v. Cortes, 591 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (stating with respect to
long lines on Election Day that “we would be blind to reality if we did not recognize that many
individuals have a limited window of opportunity to go to the polls due to their jobs, child care
and family responsibilities, or other weighty commitments. Life does not stop on election day.
Many must vote early or in the evening if they are to vote at all”). For a parallel argument
with respect to abortion rights, see Fetrow, supra note 76, at 353-54 (criticizing current undue
burden doctrine in the abortion context for evaluating challenged provisions in isolation and
failing to take into account the cumulative impact of a state’s entire legal regime on women’s
access to abortion).
91. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 250 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612
(2017).
92. Id. at 251.
93. Id.
94. Id. For more extensive discussion of the extent to which the legal system ignores the
logistical difficulties faced by poor and rural individuals, see generally Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta
R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76 (2015); Michele Statz & Lisa R. Pruitt, To Recognize the
Tyranny of Distance: A Spatial Reading of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (Aug. 3,
2017) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
95. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 253–54.
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formally possess. They put meat on the bones of an undue burden standard. The
framework for analyzing section 2 claims requires courts to look at “the extent to
which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such
areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process.”96 Courts analyzing a constitutional undue burden
claim with regard to the right to vote should do the same.97
In Planned Parenthood Southeast v. Strange (Strange II),98 Judge Myron H.
Thompson took a similarly concrete and context-sensitive approach in adjudicating
a challenge to Alabama’s requirement that a doctor who performs abortions “have
staff privileges at an acute care hospital within the same standard metropolitan statistical area” as the facility where he or she performs them.99 In a prior opinion, Judge
Thompson had laid out a framework for assessing “how ‘significant’ the obstacle
created by [a] statute is.”100 Among the factors he identified were “the nature and
circumstances of the women affected by the regulation,”101 and he pointed to “wealth
and education,” and “any personal factors that may serve to amplify the harms imposed by the regulation, such as being in an abusive relationship or lack of legal
immigration status” as circumstances a court should consider.102 Next, he pointed to
logistical concerns including the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers and “travel patterns, access to transportation, and availability of information
about abortion services.”103 Finally, he pointed to the surrounding “social, cultural,
and political context” in which women make decisions whether to terminate a pregnancy and physicians make decisions whether to provide abortion services.104
Taking these various factors into account, Judge Thompson concluded that
Alabama’s staff privileges requirement imposed an undue burden. He found that the
requirement would drive abortion providers out of Alabama’s three largest cities:

96. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982). The Supreme Court incorporated this report into
its foundational opinion construing section 2. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7
(1986).
97. In discussing the poll tax, Professor Brown asks the question whether the legislators
who enacted it would have “require[d] themselves to pay so much for the privilege of voting
that it would strain their ability to feed their children.” Brown, supra note 26, at 1551. Her
focus on what she calls “we/they legislation,” id., is a useful device for considering what kinds
of restrictions on liberty courts should uphold. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[o]ur salvation is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their
loved ones what they impose on you and me”). It is hard to imagine a legislative majority that
would place significant obstacles to voting in its own path (or even the path of its political
supporters).
98. 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
99. Id. at 1336 (quoting ALA. CODE § 26-23E-4(c) (2016)).
100. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange (Strange I), 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1288–89
(M.D. Ala. 2014).
101. Id. at 1288.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1288–89.
104. Id. at 1289.
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Birmingham, Montgomery, and Mobile.105 This would require women to travel either out-of-state or to one of the few in-state providers.
Judge Thompson’s explanation of the burden that came from the need to travel
began with the fact that an overwhelming percentage of the woman seeking abortions
in Alabama were poor.106 His account of the difficulties—financial, logistical, and
psychological—that flowed from their poverty echoed the account laid out by Judge
Ramos in the Texas voter ID case. Judge Thompson concluded:
For these women, going to another city to procure an abortion is particularly expensive and difficult. Poor women are less likely to own their
own cars and are instead dependent on public transportation, asking
friends and relatives for rides, or borrowing cars; they are less likely to
have internet access; many already have children, but are unlikely to
have regular sources of child care; and they are more likely to work on
an hourly basis with an inflexible schedule and without any paid time off
or to receive public benefits which require regular attendance at meetings
or classes. A woman who does not own her own car may need to buy two
inter-city bus tickets (one for the woman procuring the abortion, and one
for a companion) in order to travel to another city. Without regular internet access, it is more difficult to locate an abortion clinic in another city
or find an affordable hotel room. The additional time to travel for the city
requires her to find and pay for child care or to miss one or several days
of work. Furthermore, at each juncture, a woman may have to tell relatives, romantic partners, or work supervisors why she is leaving town: to
procure an abortion. . . . Finally, . . . many low-income women have never
left the cities in which they live. The idea of going to a city where they
know no one and have never visited, in order to undergo a procedure that
can be frightening in itself, can present a significant psychological hurdle. “[T]his psychological hurdle is as serious a burden as the additional
costs represented by travel.”107
And Judge Thompson directly addressed the view of some courts that “obstacles
that arise from the interactions of regulation with women’s financial constraints, as
well as other aspects of women's circumstances, [are] ineligible to be ‘substantial
obstacles’ under Casey.”108 He distinguished the burdens caused by government regulation from those caused by the government’s failure to remove preexisting barriers
(for example, by refusing to fund abortions for indigent women). A court, he declared, should not “ignore obstacles aggravated by the realities of poverty.”109
Most recently, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,110 the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the undue burden test is a form of rationality review,111 requir-

105. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc v. Strange (Strange II), 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1355 (M.D.
Ala. 2014).
106. Id. at 1356 (alteration in original).
107. Id. at 1357.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1358.
110. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
111. Id. at 2309–10 (expressly distinguishing the undue burden standard from the form of

156

I NDI ANA LA W JOUR NA L

[Vol. 93:139

ing instead that “courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer”112 and determine for themselves whether
the challenged statute “places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
choice.’”113 The Court’s detailed discussion of the lack of evidence of any health
benefits from the challenged provisions conveyed the message that entirely speculative women-protective rationales cannot counterbalance proven burdens.114
What cases like McCrory, Veasey, and Strange II show is that undue burden tests,
in the hands of courts that pay attention to the interactive effects of socioeconomic
conditions and the challenged restrictions, are not toothless. They can work to vindicate citizens’ rights to vote and women’s access to abortion. Courts can in fact evaluate both the strength of the government’s proffered interests and the extent to which
restricting access to the voting booth or to abortion actually serves those interests.
And their opinions can educate the public about the significant obstacles poor people
face in exercising their rights.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. State Board of Elections115 striking
down poll taxes offered two reasons for its conclusion that restrictions on the right
to vote demand more searching judicial review. The first one, familiar to the law
today, is that the right to vote is fundamental.116 But the second one captures a concern with economic justice: “Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”117 Thus, “the requirement of fee paying
causes an ‘invidious’ discrimination.”118

conventional rationality review articulated in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
112. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 2312 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
114. The Court pointed to record evidence that the number of women who lived at a substantial distance from an abortion provider skyrocketed as a result of Texas’s law. Id. at 2313
(pointing to the district court’s finding that the number living more than 150 miles away increased from 86,000 to 400,000, and the number living more than 200 miles from a provider
increased from 10,000 to 290,000). Although distance alone might not constitute an undue
burden, the Court explained that “those increases are but one additional burden, which, when
taken together with others that the closings brought about, and when viewed in light of the
virtual absence of any health benefit, lead us to conclude that the record adequately supports
the District Court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion.” Id.
115. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
116. Id. at 667.
117. Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
118. Id. (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), for the proposition that lines drawn on the
basis of wealth are disfavored). And even though the Harper Court did not directly address
racial equality, the Justices surely had not forgotten their decision only a year earlier in
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), where the Court had declared that Virginia’s poll
tax “was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.” Id. at 543.
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That traditional disfavor has been unheeded for decades, interred by the Burger
Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.119 But it deserves
resuscitation, particularly in an era of striking economic inequality. Everyone understands Anatole France’s rightly caustic condemnation of a regime in which citizenship means merely “the majestic quality of the law which prohibits the wealthy as
well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from being in the streets, and from
stealing bread.”120 Showing the courts, and the public, how economic disadvantage
thwarts such foundational rights as voting and access to abortion may allow for a
new form of stereoscopic understanding, which looks at the intersection of liberty
interests and economic equality. And perhaps this understanding can radiate outward
into more general discussions about the ways that individuals’ ability to participate
fully in American society are constrained by their economic situation and about our
responsibility as a society to do something about that.

119. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
120. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 87 (1905).

